Arnaud
5a9e306357
Bump to 0.5.1. Fixes: unfollowed-redirect SSRF + DNS-rebinding in AI url-import and webhook dispatch (new safeFetch with IP-pinned undici dispatcher); cross-user photo deletion via unvalidated recipe/review storage keys; comment-moderation and tier-quota checks trusting a stale cached session role/tier instead of the DB. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
63 lines
2.7 KiB
TypeScript
63 lines
2.7 KiB
TypeScript
import { S3Client, PutObjectCommand, DeleteObjectCommand } from "@aws-sdk/client-s3";
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import { getSignedUrl } from "@aws-sdk/s3-request-presigner";
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const bucket = process.env["STORAGE_BUCKET"] || "epicure-uploads";
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const endpoint = process.env["STORAGE_ENDPOINT"] || "http://localhost:9000";
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const publicUrl = process.env["STORAGE_PUBLIC_URL"] || "http://localhost:9000";
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// getPublicUrl() below runs in the browser too — non-NEXT_PUBLIC_ vars are never
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// inlined into the client bundle, so it needs its own NEXT_PUBLIC_ copy of the value.
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const clientPublicUrl = process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_STORAGE_PUBLIC_URL || "http://localhost:9000";
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const credentials = {
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accessKeyId: process.env["STORAGE_ACCESS_KEY"] ?? "minioadmin",
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secretAccessKey: process.env["STORAGE_SECRET_KEY"] ?? "minioadmin",
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};
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const s3 = new S3Client({
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region: process.env["STORAGE_REGION"] ?? "us-east-1",
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endpoint,
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forcePathStyle: true,
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credentials,
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});
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// Presigned URLs are PUT/GET directly by the browser, so they must be signed
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// against an endpoint the browser can actually resolve — not the internal
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// docker hostname `s3` (and `endpoint`) use for server-to-server calls. Signing
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// is pure crypto (no network call), so a second client pointed at the public
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// URL is safe even though it's never used to make a real request itself.
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const presignS3 = new S3Client({
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region: process.env["STORAGE_REGION"] ?? "us-east-1",
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endpoint: publicUrl,
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forcePathStyle: true,
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credentials,
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});
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export async function createPresignedUploadUrl(key: string, contentType: string): Promise<string> {
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const command = new PutObjectCommand({ Bucket: bucket, Key: key, ContentType: contentType });
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return getSignedUrl(presignS3, command, { expiresIn: 300 });
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}
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export async function deleteObject(key: string): Promise<void> {
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await s3.send(new DeleteObjectCommand({ Bucket: bucket, Key: key }));
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}
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export function getPublicUrl(key: string): string {
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return `${clientPublicUrl}/${bucket}/${key}`;
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}
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/**
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* A recipe/review photo's storage key is only trustworthy if it matches the
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* exact prefix issued by /api/v1/upload/presign for this recipe + user +
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* purpose — otherwise a client could submit another user's key (discoverable
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* from a public recipe's rendered <Image> src, or a review's photoKey in API
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* responses) and have it adopted, then later evicted, triggering
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* deleteObject() against an object it never owned.
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*/
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export function isOwnedRecipePhotoKey(key: string, recipeId: string, userId: string): boolean {
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return key.startsWith(`recipes/${recipeId}/photos/${userId}-`);
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}
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export function isOwnedReviewPhotoKey(key: string, recipeId: string, userId: string): boolean {
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return key.startsWith(`recipes/${recipeId}/reviews/${userId}-`);
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}
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