Files
Arnaud 362f65656b fix: audit fixes — tier-quota bypass, webhook SSRF, auth hardening, pagination, a11y
Full audit (bugs/UI-UX/backend/feature-gap) turned up a money-leak AI quota
bypass, webhook SSRF, and a long tail of missing pagination/auth/a11y work.
Fixes land together since HANDOFF.md tracked them as one backlog.

- AI routes charge tier quota before generating; nutrition POST is author-only
- Webhook dispatch re-validates URL per delivery (SSRF/DNS-rebinding), treats
  redirects as failures; recipe.published now actually dispatches
- New indexes/unique constraints on recipes, meal-planning, comments FK cascade
- Recipe PUT/restore snapshot only inside the transaction, after validation
- Recipe DELETE cleans up S3 objects (recipe + review photos)
- Optimistic UI (favorite/star/follow/shopping-list) rolls back on failure
- Upload presign enforces file size cap + per-tier storage quota
- Route-level loading/error/not-found states across (app), admin, and root
- middleware.ts guards (app)/admin; requireAdmin checks DB role, not cached
  session; rate limiting applied to both session and API-key branches,
  bucketed per key; Stripe webhook dedupes by event id
- Pagination added to recipes, feed, profile, comments, pantry, admin tables
- Nav shows real avatar + profile link + dark-mode toggle; destructive actions
  standardized on AlertDialog
- Unsaved-changes guard + real ingredient/step validation on recipe form;
  canonical /recipes/[id] used in-app; next/image migration; aria-labels and
  alt text across icon buttons, avatars, recipe photos
- packages/api-types removed (zero callers, too drifted to safely rewire);
  openapi.ts and ai-keys error shape drift fixed; BYOK decrypt failures now
  surface instead of silently falling back to the platform key

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-09 21:50:35 +02:00

120 lines
3.9 KiB
TypeScript

import { NextRequest, NextResponse } from "next/server";
import crypto from "node:crypto";
import { db, users, processedStripeEvents, eq } from "@epicure/db";
// Stripe webhook handler — verifies stripe-signature header using HMAC-SHA256.
// Handles:
// - checkout.session.completed → upgrade user to pro
// - customer.subscription.deleted → downgrade user to free
const STRIPE_TOLERANCE_SECONDS = 300; // 5 minutes
function verifyStripeSignature(
rawBody: string,
sigHeader: string,
secret: string
): { valid: boolean; payload: string | null } {
// sigHeader format: "t=<timestamp>,v1=<hmac>[,v1=<hmac>...]"
const parts = sigHeader.split(",");
const tPart = parts.find((p) => p.startsWith("t="));
const v1Parts = parts.filter((p) => p.startsWith("v1="));
if (!tPart || v1Parts.length === 0) {
return { valid: false, payload: null };
}
const timestamp = tPart.slice(2);
const tsNum = parseInt(timestamp, 10);
if (isNaN(tsNum)) return { valid: false, payload: null };
// Reject stale webhooks
const nowSec = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
if (Math.abs(nowSec - tsNum) > STRIPE_TOLERANCE_SECONDS) {
return { valid: false, payload: null };
}
const signedPayload = `${timestamp}.${rawBody}`;
const expected = crypto
.createHmac("sha256", secret)
.update(signedPayload, "utf8")
.digest();
const matched = v1Parts.some((v1Part) => {
const provided = v1Part.slice(3); // strip "v1="
let providedBuf: Buffer;
try {
providedBuf = Buffer.from(provided, "hex");
} catch {
return false;
}
if (providedBuf.length !== expected.length) return false;
return crypto.timingSafeEqual(expected, providedBuf);
});
return { valid: matched, payload: matched ? rawBody : null };
}
export async function POST(req: NextRequest) {
const body = await req.text();
const sig = req.headers.get("stripe-signature");
const webhookSecret = process.env["STRIPE_WEBHOOK_SECRET"];
if (!sig || !webhookSecret) {
return NextResponse.json({ error: "Stripe not configured" }, { status: 400 });
}
const { valid } = verifyStripeSignature(body, sig, webhookSecret);
if (!valid) {
return NextResponse.json({ error: "Invalid signature" }, { status: 400 });
}
let event: { id: string; type: string; data: { object: Record<string, unknown> } };
try {
event = JSON.parse(body) as typeof event;
} catch {
return NextResponse.json({ error: "Invalid JSON" }, { status: 400 });
}
if (!event.id) {
return NextResponse.json({ error: "Missing event id" }, { status: 400 });
}
// Dedup: Stripe may redeliver the same event within its retry/tolerance
// window. Record the event id before processing; if it's already been
// recorded, skip processing (but still ack with 200 so Stripe stops
// retrying).
const [inserted] = await db
.insert(processedStripeEvents)
.values({ id: event.id, type: event.type })
.onConflictDoNothing()
.returning({ id: processedStripeEvents.id });
if (!inserted) {
return NextResponse.json({ received: true, duplicate: true });
}
switch (event.type) {
case "checkout.session.completed": {
// client_reference_id is set to our internal userId when the Checkout Session is created.
const userId = event.data.object["client_reference_id"];
const customerId = event.data.object["customer"];
if (typeof userId === "string" && typeof customerId === "string") {
await db.update(users).set({ tier: "pro", stripeCustomerId: customerId }).where(eq(users.id, userId));
}
break;
}
case "customer.subscription.deleted": {
const customerId = event.data.object["customer"];
if (typeof customerId === "string") {
await db.update(users).set({ tier: "free" }).where(eq(users.stripeCustomerId, customerId));
}
break;
}
default:
// ignore unhandled event types
break;
}
return NextResponse.json({ received: true });
}