3042d289a0
Full list of the audit's confirmed findings and their fixes: - Stored XSS via unescaped JSON-LD on the public recipe page (app/r/[id]/page.tsx) — escape < before injecting. - CSP allowed unsafe-eval in production — now dev-only (Next prod never eval()s; only its HMR does). - avatarUrl accepted any URL with no ownership check — now takes an avatarKey issued by avatar-presign, validated server-side, same pattern as recipe/review photos. - No session revocation on password change/reset — both now revoke other sessions (revokeOtherSessions: true, revokeSessionsOnPasswordReset). - Rate-limit bypass via spoofable X-Forwarded-For — take the last (proxy-appended) hop instead of the first (client-supplied) one, matching the single-Traefik-hop topology. - Webhook signing secrets stored plaintext — now AES-256-GCM encrypted like every other secret in this app, with a legacy- plaintext fallback for pre-existing rows (bare hex has no ":", our ciphertext format always does). - Better Auth's own rate limiter defaulted to in-memory storage, ineffective across replicas — now backed by the same Redis as lib/rate-limit.ts (secondaryStorage), with storeSessionInDatabase explicit so session storage itself doesn't move as a side effect. - Presigned upload URLs didn't bind the declared file size to the actual upload, letting a client under-declare size (and quota charge) then PUT an arbitrarily large object — switched to S3 presigned POST with a signed content-length-range condition, enforced by the storage server itself. - generateMetadata() on the recipe page skipped the visibility filter the page body uses, leaking a private recipe's title via <title> to any signed-in user with the id. - Block/unblock had no rate limit, unlike follow/unfollow. - AI quota was charged even when a user's own BYOK key was used (their own credentials/billing) — added an isByok flag through the config-resolution chain and skip the charge when set. Also wired BYOK into generate/generate-from-idea/translate/import-url, which never looked it up at all before. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
79 lines
3.6 KiB
TypeScript
79 lines
3.6 KiB
TypeScript
import { NextResponse } from "next/server";
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import { headers } from "next/headers";
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import { auth } from "@/lib/auth/server";
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import { db, users, eq } from "@epicure/db";
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import { z } from "zod";
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import { gravatarUrl } from "@/lib/gravatar";
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import { USERNAME_PATTERN, isUsernameTaken } from "@/lib/username";
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import { isOwnedAvatarKey, getPublicUrl } from "@/lib/storage";
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const PatchSchema = z.object({
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name: z.string().min(1).max(100).optional(),
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locale: z.string().max(10).optional(),
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bio: z.string().max(500).optional().nullable(),
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privateBio: z.string().max(2000).optional().nullable(),
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isPrivate: z.boolean().optional(),
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username: z.string().trim().toLowerCase().regex(USERNAME_PATTERN, "3-20 characters, lowercase letters, numbers, and underscores only").optional(),
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// The storage key returned by /api/v1/upload/avatar-presign (not a URL) —
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// the server validates it was actually issued to this user and builds the
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// public URL itself, so a client can't point avatarUrl at an arbitrary or
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// another user's object. `null` reverts to the initials fallback (or
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// Gravatar, if useGravatar is on — see below).
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avatarKey: z.string().max(500).optional().nullable(),
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// Off by default (Settings → Profile) — Gravatar is looked up by an MD5
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// hash of the user's email, sent to a third party.
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useGravatar: z.boolean().optional(),
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});
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export async function PATCH(req: Request) {
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const session = await auth.api.getSession({ headers: await headers() });
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if (!session) return NextResponse.json({ error: "Unauthorized" }, { status: 401 });
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const body = PatchSchema.safeParse(await req.json());
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if (!body.success) return NextResponse.json({ error: body.error.flatten() }, { status: 400 });
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if (body.data.username !== undefined && (await isUsernameTaken(body.data.username, session.user.id))) {
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return NextResponse.json({ error: "Username already taken" }, { status: 409 });
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}
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const { avatarKey, useGravatar, ...rest } = body.data;
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const updates: Partial<typeof users.$inferInsert> = { ...rest };
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// useGravatar is only ever toggled from the settings form, never alongside
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// an avatar upload/removal in the same request — so it's fine for these
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// two branches to each independently decide the resulting avatarUrl below.
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if (useGravatar !== undefined) {
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updates.useGravatar = useGravatar;
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if (!(await hasCustomAvatar(session.user.id))) {
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updates.avatarUrl = useGravatar ? gravatarUrl(session.user.email) : null;
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}
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}
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if (avatarKey !== undefined) {
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if (avatarKey === null) {
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const gravatarOptedIn = useGravatar ?? (await getUseGravatar(session.user.id));
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updates.avatarUrl = gravatarOptedIn ? gravatarUrl(session.user.email) : null;
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updates.hasCustomAvatar = false;
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} else {
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if (!isOwnedAvatarKey(avatarKey, session.user.id)) {
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return NextResponse.json({ error: "Invalid avatar key" }, { status: 400 });
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}
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updates.avatarUrl = getPublicUrl(avatarKey);
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updates.hasCustomAvatar = true;
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}
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}
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await db.update(users).set(updates).where(eq(users.id, session.user.id));
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return NextResponse.json({ ok: true, avatarUrl: updates.avatarUrl });
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}
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async function hasCustomAvatar(userId: string): Promise<boolean> {
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const row = await db.query.users.findFirst({ where: eq(users.id, userId), columns: { hasCustomAvatar: true } });
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return row?.hasCustomAvatar ?? false;
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}
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async function getUseGravatar(userId: string): Promise<boolean> {
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const row = await db.query.users.findFirst({ where: eq(users.id, userId), columns: { useGravatar: true } });
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return row?.useGravatar ?? false;
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}
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