Security audit fixes (see SECURITY_AUDIT.md):
- lib/tiers.ts: checkAndIncrementTierLimit's recipe/storage branches did a
live count/sum check with no lock tying it to the later write, so two
concurrent requests near the cap could both pass and both write past the
limit. Added checkTierLimitInTransaction — holds a per-user Postgres
advisory lock for the duration of the caller's transaction, so the check
and the write are atomic together. Applied to every recipe/storage write
path (recipes create/update, fork, rate, avatar, and 7 AI recipe-creation
routes).
- Adversarial re-verification of that fix caught a bigger gap in the same
area: four AI routes (photo import, idea generation, batch-cook,
translate-to-new-draft) had no recipe-limit check at all. Fixed.
- Added missing per-user rate limits to 5 AI endpoints (adapt, drinks,
pairings, translate, variations) that had none, unlike their siblings.
- search page now checks for a session server-side, matching every other
page under (app)/ — defense in depth; the underlying API was already
public by design and proxy.ts already blocked unauthenticated requests.
- admin/settings route now uses the shared requireAdmin instead of a local
duplicate.
- Documented two admin support-ticket endpoints missing from the OpenAPI
spec; verified full route/OpenAPI parity otherwise.
- Bumped drizzle-orm to fix a SQL-identifier-escaping CVE, and overrode two
transitive deps (esbuild, postcss) with known CVEs. pnpm audit is clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Arnaud
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