3042d289a0
Full list of the audit's confirmed findings and their fixes: - Stored XSS via unescaped JSON-LD on the public recipe page (app/r/[id]/page.tsx) — escape < before injecting. - CSP allowed unsafe-eval in production — now dev-only (Next prod never eval()s; only its HMR does). - avatarUrl accepted any URL with no ownership check — now takes an avatarKey issued by avatar-presign, validated server-side, same pattern as recipe/review photos. - No session revocation on password change/reset — both now revoke other sessions (revokeOtherSessions: true, revokeSessionsOnPasswordReset). - Rate-limit bypass via spoofable X-Forwarded-For — take the last (proxy-appended) hop instead of the first (client-supplied) one, matching the single-Traefik-hop topology. - Webhook signing secrets stored plaintext — now AES-256-GCM encrypted like every other secret in this app, with a legacy- plaintext fallback for pre-existing rows (bare hex has no ":", our ciphertext format always does). - Better Auth's own rate limiter defaulted to in-memory storage, ineffective across replicas — now backed by the same Redis as lib/rate-limit.ts (secondaryStorage), with storeSessionInDatabase explicit so session storage itself doesn't move as a side effect. - Presigned upload URLs didn't bind the declared file size to the actual upload, letting a client under-declare size (and quota charge) then PUT an arbitrarily large object — switched to S3 presigned POST with a signed content-length-range condition, enforced by the storage server itself. - generateMetadata() on the recipe page skipped the visibility filter the page body uses, leaking a private recipe's title via <title> to any signed-in user with the id. - Block/unblock had no rate limit, unlike follow/unfollow. - AI quota was charged even when a user's own BYOK key was used (their own credentials/billing) — added an isByok flag through the config-resolution chain and skip the charge when set. Also wired BYOK into generate/generate-from-idea/translate/import-url, which never looked it up at all before. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
46 lines
1.7 KiB
TypeScript
46 lines
1.7 KiB
TypeScript
import { NextRequest, NextResponse } from "next/server";
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import { z } from "zod";
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import { requireSession } from "@/lib/api-auth";
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import { createPresignedUploadPost } from "@/lib/storage";
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import { checkAndIncrementTierLimit, TierLimitError } from "@/lib/tiers";
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const ALLOWED_TYPES = ["image/jpeg", "image/png", "image/webp", "image/avif"] as const;
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type AllowedType = (typeof ALLOWED_TYPES)[number];
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const MAX_FILE_SIZE = 5 * 1024 * 1024;
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const Schema = z.object({
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contentType: z.string().refine((t): t is AllowedType => (ALLOWED_TYPES as readonly string[]).includes(t), {
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message: "Content type must be jpeg, png, webp, or avif",
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}),
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fileSize: z.number().int().positive().max(MAX_FILE_SIZE, "File exceeds 5MB limit"),
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});
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export async function POST(req: NextRequest) {
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const { session, response } = await requireSession();
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if (response) return response;
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const body = await req.json() as unknown;
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const parsed = Schema.safeParse(body);
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if (!parsed.success) {
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return NextResponse.json({ error: "Validation error", issues: parsed.error.issues }, { status: 400 });
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}
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const { contentType, fileSize } = parsed.data;
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try {
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const sizeMb = Math.ceil(fileSize / (1024 * 1024));
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await checkAndIncrementTierLimit(session!.user.id, session!.user.tier as "free" | "pro", "storage", sizeMb);
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} catch (err) {
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if (err instanceof TierLimitError) {
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return NextResponse.json({ error: "Storage limit reached for your tier" }, { status: 403 });
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}
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throw err;
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}
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const ext = contentType.split("/")[1] ?? "jpg";
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const key = `user-avatars/${session!.user.id}/${crypto.randomUUID()}.${ext}`;
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const { url, fields } = await createPresignedUploadPost(key, contentType, MAX_FILE_SIZE);
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return NextResponse.json({ url, fields, key });
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}
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