feat: per-category email prefs, admin ops webhooks, per-user feature toggles (v0.61.0)
- Notification email preferences: every push category (follow, comment, reply, reaction, rating, mention, leftoverExpiring, shoppingList) now has an independent email toggle, plus a Weekly Digest toggle. Previously email sent unconditionally whenever the recipient had one; now gated the same way push already was. The weekly-digest cron route excludes opted-out users. - Admin-only site-wide webhooks (Admin → Webhooks): new signups, support tickets, and reports filed can now fire an HMAC-signed HTTP webhook (Slack/Discord/ops alerting), independent of the existing per-user webhooks (which stay scoped to a user's own recipe/meal-plan/shopping-list events). Signing/delivery logic factored into lib/webhook-delivery.ts and shared by both dispatchers instead of duplicated. - Settings → Features: users can hide Nutrition, Pantry, Meal Plan, Shopping Lists, Collections, or Messages from their own nav. Purely cosmetic — hidden pages stay reachable by direct link, nothing is access-restricted. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -2,17 +2,7 @@ import crypto from "crypto";
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import { db } from "@epicure/db";
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import { webhooks, webhookDeliveries } from "@epicure/db";
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import { eq, and } from "@epicure/db";
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import { safeFetch } from "@/lib/validate-webhook-url";
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import { decrypt } from "@/lib/encrypt";
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// Secrets created before encryption-at-rest was added are a bare 64-char hex
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// string (crypto.randomBytes(32).toString("hex")) with no ":" separators —
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// encrypt()'s output is always "iv:authTag:ciphertext". Fall back to treating
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// the value as already-plaintext rather than a hard migration, since this is
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// only reached with a value this app itself generated (never user input).
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function decryptWebhookSecret(stored: string): string {
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return stored.split(":").length === 3 ? decrypt(stored) : stored;
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}
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import { deliverWebhook } from "@/lib/webhook-delivery";
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export const WEBHOOK_EVENTS = [
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"recipe.created",
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@@ -36,29 +26,7 @@ export async function dispatchWebhook(userId: string, event: WebhookEvent, paylo
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await Promise.allSettled(
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filtered.map(async (hook) => {
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const body = JSON.stringify({ event, payload, timestamp: new Date().toISOString() });
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const sig = crypto.createHmac("sha256", decryptWebhookSecret(hook.secret)).update(body).digest("hex");
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let statusCode = 0;
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let success = false;
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try {
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// safeFetch resolves and pins the connection to a single validated IP
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// (and re-validates + re-pins every redirect hop), so there's no
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// separate re-resolution for a rebinding attack to exploit.
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const res = await safeFetch(hook.url, {
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method: "POST",
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headers: {
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"Content-Type": "application/json",
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"X-Epicure-Signature": `sha256=${sig}`,
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"X-Epicure-Event": event,
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},
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body,
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signal: AbortSignal.timeout(10000),
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});
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statusCode = res.status;
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success = res.ok;
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} catch {
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// delivery failed; statusCode stays 0, success stays false
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}
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const { statusCode, success } = await deliverWebhook(hook.url, hook.secret, event, payload);
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await db.insert(webhookDeliveries).values({
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id: crypto.randomUUID(),
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webhookId: hook.id,
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