fix: audit fixes — tier-quota bypass, webhook SSRF, auth hardening, pagination, a11y

Full audit (bugs/UI-UX/backend/feature-gap) turned up a money-leak AI quota
bypass, webhook SSRF, and a long tail of missing pagination/auth/a11y work.
Fixes land together since HANDOFF.md tracked them as one backlog.

- AI routes charge tier quota before generating; nutrition POST is author-only
- Webhook dispatch re-validates URL per delivery (SSRF/DNS-rebinding), treats
  redirects as failures; recipe.published now actually dispatches
- New indexes/unique constraints on recipes, meal-planning, comments FK cascade
- Recipe PUT/restore snapshot only inside the transaction, after validation
- Recipe DELETE cleans up S3 objects (recipe + review photos)
- Optimistic UI (favorite/star/follow/shopping-list) rolls back on failure
- Upload presign enforces file size cap + per-tier storage quota
- Route-level loading/error/not-found states across (app), admin, and root
- middleware.ts guards (app)/admin; requireAdmin checks DB role, not cached
  session; rate limiting applied to both session and API-key branches,
  bucketed per key; Stripe webhook dedupes by event id
- Pagination added to recipes, feed, profile, comments, pantry, admin tables
- Nav shows real avatar + profile link + dark-mode toggle; destructive actions
  standardized on AlertDialog
- Unsaved-changes guard + real ingredient/step validation on recipe form;
  canonical /recipes/[id] used in-app; next/image migration; aria-labels and
  alt text across icon buttons, avatars, recipe photos
- packages/api-types removed (zero callers, too drifted to safely rewire);
  openapi.ts and ai-keys error shape drift fixed; BYOK decrypt failures now
  surface instead of silently falling back to the platform key

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

apps/web/app/api/webhooks/stripe/route.ts

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import { NextRequest, NextResponse } from "next/server";
 import crypto from "node:crypto";
-import { db, users, eq } from "@epicure/db";
+import { db, users, processedStripeEvents, eq } from "@epicure/db";
 
 // Stripe webhook handler — verifies stripe-signature header using HMAC-SHA256.
 // Handles:
@@ -68,13 +68,31 @@ export async function POST(req: NextRequest) {
     return NextResponse.json({ error: "Invalid signature" }, { status: 400 });
   }
 
-  let event: { type: string; data: { object: Record<string, unknown> } };
+  let event: { id: string; type: string; data: { object: Record<string, unknown> } };
   try {
     event = JSON.parse(body) as typeof event;
   } catch {
     return NextResponse.json({ error: "Invalid JSON" }, { status: 400 });
   }
 
+  if (!event.id) {
+    return NextResponse.json({ error: "Missing event id" }, { status: 400 });
+  }
+
+  // Dedup: Stripe may redeliver the same event within its retry/tolerance
+  // window. Record the event id before processing; if it's already been
+  // recorded, skip processing (but still ack with 200 so Stripe stops
+  // retrying).
+  const [inserted] = await db
+    .insert(processedStripeEvents)
+    .values({ id: event.id, type: event.type })
+    .onConflictDoNothing()
+    .returning({ id: processedStripeEvents.id });
+
+  if (!inserted) {
+    return NextResponse.json({ received: true, duplicate: true });
+  }
+
   switch (event.type) {
     case "checkout.session.completed": {
       // client_reference_id is set to our internal userId when the Checkout Session is created.