security: fix full audit findings (v0.32.0)
Full list of the audit's confirmed findings and their fixes: - Stored XSS via unescaped JSON-LD on the public recipe page (app/r/[id]/page.tsx) — escape < before injecting. - CSP allowed unsafe-eval in production — now dev-only (Next prod never eval()s; only its HMR does). - avatarUrl accepted any URL with no ownership check — now takes an avatarKey issued by avatar-presign, validated server-side, same pattern as recipe/review photos. - No session revocation on password change/reset — both now revoke other sessions (revokeOtherSessions: true, revokeSessionsOnPasswordReset). - Rate-limit bypass via spoofable X-Forwarded-For — take the last (proxy-appended) hop instead of the first (client-supplied) one, matching the single-Traefik-hop topology. - Webhook signing secrets stored plaintext — now AES-256-GCM encrypted like every other secret in this app, with a legacy- plaintext fallback for pre-existing rows (bare hex has no ":", our ciphertext format always does). - Better Auth's own rate limiter defaulted to in-memory storage, ineffective across replicas — now backed by the same Redis as lib/rate-limit.ts (secondaryStorage), with storeSessionInDatabase explicit so session storage itself doesn't move as a side effect. - Presigned upload URLs didn't bind the declared file size to the actual upload, letting a client under-declare size (and quota charge) then PUT an arbitrarily large object — switched to S3 presigned POST with a signed content-length-range condition, enforced by the storage server itself. - generateMetadata() on the recipe page skipped the visibility filter the page body uses, leaking a private recipe's title via <title> to any signed-in user with the id. - Block/unblock had no rate limit, unlike follow/unfollow. - AI quota was charged even when a user's own BYOK key was used (their own credentials/billing) — added an isByok flag through the config-resolution chain and skip the charge when set. Also wired BYOK into generate/generate-from-idea/translate/import-url, which never looked it up at all before. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
+32
-5
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
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import { S3Client, PutObjectCommand, DeleteObjectCommand } from "@aws-sdk/client-s3";
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import { getSignedUrl } from "@aws-sdk/s3-request-presigner";
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import { S3Client, DeleteObjectCommand } from "@aws-sdk/client-s3";
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import { createPresignedPost } from "@aws-sdk/s3-presigned-post";
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const bucket = process.env["STORAGE_BUCKET"] || "epicure-uploads";
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const endpoint = process.env["STORAGE_ENDPOINT"] || "http://localhost:9000";
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@@ -32,9 +32,31 @@ const presignS3 = new S3Client({
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credentials,
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});
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export async function createPresignedUploadUrl(key: string, contentType: string): Promise<string> {
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const command = new PutObjectCommand({ Bucket: bucket, Key: key, ContentType: contentType });
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return getSignedUrl(presignS3, command, { expiresIn: 300 });
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/**
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* A presigned PUT URL only signs Bucket/Key/ContentType — nothing binds the
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* actual request body size to what the caller declared when it asked for the
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* URL (and was charged storage-tier quota for), so a client could declare
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* 1 byte and then PUT an arbitrarily large object. S3/MinIO's POST-policy
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* upload flow is the fix: `content-length-range` is a *signed* condition,
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* enforced by the storage server itself when it receives the upload — a
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* mismatched Content-Length is rejected before the bytes are ever accepted,
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* not just checked against something the client also controls.
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*/
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export async function createPresignedUploadPost(
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key: string,
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contentType: string,
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maxBytes: number
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): Promise<{ url: string; fields: Record<string, string> }> {
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return createPresignedPost(presignS3, {
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Bucket: bucket,
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Key: key,
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Conditions: [
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["content-length-range", 0, maxBytes],
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{ "Content-Type": contentType },
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],
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Fields: { "Content-Type": contentType },
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Expires: 300,
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});
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}
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export async function deleteObject(key: string): Promise<void> {
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@@ -60,3 +82,8 @@ export function isOwnedRecipePhotoKey(key: string, recipeId: string, userId: str
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export function isOwnedReviewPhotoKey(key: string, recipeId: string, userId: string): boolean {
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return key.startsWith(`recipes/${recipeId}/reviews/${userId}-`);
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}
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/** Same rationale as isOwnedRecipePhotoKey, for the avatar-presign key prefix. */
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export function isOwnedAvatarKey(key: string, userId: string): boolean {
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return key.startsWith(`user-avatars/${userId}/`);
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}
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